By Henry Sokolski
Although it received scant attention, one of the first objects Israel’s military targeted was Gaza’s electrical generating plants. Israel was legally free to do so because it is not a party to Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions — an international treaty that discourages military attacks against civilian assets.
In contrast, The United States and all its key allies have signed or ratified Protocol 1, which discourages military assaults against such objects. The Protocol also discourages strikes against nuclear power plants if such assaults could result in the release of “dangerous forces” — e.g., harmful radiation.
The Pentagon, however, has pushed back against this. It insists that if it is “necessary,” U.S. military commanders may attack civilian facilities even if doing so would severely harm innocent civilians. This includes the electrical grid, and even power reactors. What is awkward is that Putin’s military, which is assaulting Ukraine’s electrical system and the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, has embraced this position.
All of this raises the question of what America’s future policy should be. Should the United States double down on the Pentagon’s stance or revise its policy in light of recent developments?
These questions were the focus of two divergent presentations that NPEC and the American Bar Association showcased in a recent cohosted event, “What Is America’s Obligation to Avert Targeting Power Reactors.”
Our current policies on targeting of power reactors are more in line with Putin’s than with those of our allies.
Gary Corn, a professor of military law, clarified the Pentagon’s current position. I critiqued it.
Our current policies on targeting of power reactors are more in line with Putin’s than with those of our allies. Here are three points I made in a recent paper:
* Russia has targeted power reactors that do not produce electricity that provides “regular, significant, direct support of [Ukrainian] military operations.”
* These attacks have risked the release of dangerous forces that could severely harm innocent civilians.
* Almost all of America’s allies have ratified Protocol 1. The US has not. EU, UK, Germany foreign and military ministers have said strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure and Zaporizhzhia are war crimes. The US has been silent.
* In fact, US has not only not backed its allies’ Protocol 1-inspired declarations regarding the “criminality” of Russia’s actions, but in its latest description of America’s obligations as a signee to Protocol 1, the Pentagon insists the US is ultimately free to target power reactors even if this would release of significant amounts of radiation that could cause severe harm to innocent civilians. Such targeting would be warranted, it contends if a commander deemed that conducting such an attack seemed necessary to achieving an important military objective. Yet, what is a military “important” objective, and what is “severe harm,” the manual admits, are “subjective” calls (see DOD Law of War Manual, section 5.13, pp. 279-280).
With more nuclear plants operating in potential warzones, American and allied military planners and policy makers will have to decide which of these views is correct. A good place to begin is the workshop’s contrasting presentations and discussion.
Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, served as deputy for nonproliferation in the Defense Department and is the author of Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future.
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