By Henry Sokolski
Last week, a month-long review of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) began at the United Nations headquarters in New York City. Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN), a U.S.-funded service that reaches more than one million viewers in the Middle East, asked me whether the NPT keeps nuclear weapons from spreading.
For more than half a century, the world has relied on one central framework to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Today, that system is under exceptional strain. There are no longer binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals. Global powers are modernizing instead of disarming. And tensions around Iran’s nuclear program continue to escalate.
In the discussion, “I was asked, Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons gives countries the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. So where does that right actually begin – and where does proliferation start?”
That’s the key question – and for decades, we’ve avoided answering it clearly. The standard approach has been simple: If a program is declared peaceful, has a civilian purpose, and is under some form of inspection – then it’s acceptable.
I make five points. First, if the NPT is to succeed in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, it must clarify what “peaceful” nuclear activities are permissible. Making nuclear fuel has brought Iran, North Korea, and Iraq either up to or over the red line of nuclear weapons manufacturing. Henceforth, the treaty needs to be interpreted to prohibit states that lack nuclear weapons from engaging in this activity. The U.S. NPT delegation seems to have taken this point on: Yesterday, U.S. representative Christopher Yeaw told the review conference that there is no “inalienable right” to enrich uranium.
Second, nuclear-armed states outside of the treaty – Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea – should be encouraged to begin to come into compliance with the NPT. Similarly, nuclear-armed state treaty signatories – the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France – need to honor the NPT’s call for good faith negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons arsenals.
Third, states that violate treaty obligations by refusing routine nuclear inspections – e.g., Iran and previously North Korea – should not be allowed to withdraw from the NPT until they come into full compliance. Any attempt to withdraw while noncompliant should be subject to automatic country-neutral sanctions that the United Nations should impose.
Fourth, the treaty’s prohibition on the manufacture of nuclear weapons, including non-nuclear components (e.g., implosion devices, etc.), must be enforced. Currently, there is no enforcement agency to do this. That should be corrected.
Will there be agreement on these issues? Probably not. But that doesn’t mean the discussion isn’t valuable. Because these conferences are where you define the debate – where you set the direction. And once those issues are clearly on the table, they can be carried forward into other forums. That’s how progress happens.
Fifth, US representative to NPT review conference asserts there’s no inalienable right to enrich uranium, that such “rights” are “imaginary.” For an explanation why see https:// tinyurl.com/ynh47scj.
To watch the full interview, click here.
Henry Sokolski is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. He was deputy for nonproliferation policy in the Department of Defense (1989–1993), and is the author of China, Russia, and the Coming Cool War (2024).
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