A recent New York Times editorial asked, “Will the U.S. help the Saudis get a nuclear weapon?” It’s a reasonable question.
On Friday, Energy Secretary Rick Perry will be in London, meeting with Saudi Arabian officials to discuss terms of a nuclear deal between the two countries to build U.S.-designed Westinghouse nuclear reactors in the oil-rich desert kingdom, according to multiple, credible media reports. Perry sidetracked at visit to Indian to meet with the Saudis in London this week.
The Saudis have been negotiating with the U.S. for several years over a Saudi wish to build some 16 nuclear units over the next 24 years, and have been talking with a consortium of companies led by now-bankrupt Westinghouse on the project. So far, no big deal.
The 1954 Atomic Energy Act Section 123 provides for a mechanism for U.S. firms to aid foreign nuclear power projects, but what’s known as a “123 Agreement” requires congressional approval. Congress in 2009 approved a 123 Agreement with the United Arab Emirates. A South Korean consortium is now building four APR 1400 reactors totaling about 5.6 GW, with Korea Electric Power Co. in the lead role. The first unit is scheduled to go into service this year. The Korean reactor is based on the Westinghouse 80+ pressurized water design and Westinghouse is a partner in the consortium.
A key feature of the UAE 123 Agreement is that the UAE agreed it would not enrich uranium or reprocess spent nuclear fuel, a so-called “gold standard” to protect against diversion of a civilian reactor program into a nuclear weapons program.
There’s the rub. The Saudis are refusing to agree to eschew enrichment or reprocessing and show no signs of budging. The Washington Post noted in a news article, “For the Trump administration, the contest poses a thorny choice between promoting U.S. companies and fighting nuclear proliferation. If the administration wants to boost the chances of a U.S. consortium led by Westinghouse, it may need to bend rules designed to limit nuclear proliferation in an unstable part of the world. That could heighten security risks and encourage other Middle Eastern countries to follow suit.”
Part of the back story to the Saudi plan to go atomic is Iran and the nuclear deal between Iran and the U.S. and European countries to forestall Iran’s weapons program. Iran did not give up uranium enrichment in the deal and has substantial enrichment capability. What’s more, the Trump administration professes a wish to scuttle the Iran agreement.
Saudi Arabia and Iran are rivals for dominance in the region. An article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists by non-proliferation experts Victor Gilinsky (a Democrat) and Henry Sokolski (a Republican), opposing a “permissive” deal with the Saudis, says, “They compete with Iran for influence in the Middle East, and they are obsessed with this rivalry. They are convinced that they need to match Iran’s nuclear potential. That means being within arm’s reach of a Bomb. These circumstances shouldn’t surprise anyone, and in fact one of the main reasons to restrain Iran is precisely to avoid such a scenario.”
The Trump administration is putting on a full press to get the Saudis signed up to a deal. Trump, his controversial son-in-law Jared Kushner, and Perry have traveled to Riyadh to advance a deal, and Perry is now off to London, hoping to seal an agreement.
But if an agreement with Saudi Arabia permits enrichment or reprocessing, it will face strong opposition in Congress, particularly in a Senate where the GOP has a razor-thin majority. The Wall Street Journal quoted Sen. Ed Markey, a Massachusetts Democrat, “The new Saudi ambassador came into my office in January, just last month, and I told him that I would demand a vote and debate on the Senate floor on any proposed 123 Agreement with Saudi Arabia. It seems crazy to loosen important nonproliferation standards just to secure an uncertain commercial deal.”
Should the U.S. get shut out of supplying Saudi Arabia with nuclear technology, the kingdom will have plenty of other bidders, including South Korea, China and Russia.
Ernest Moniz, an Obama administration energy secretary, proposed a compromise in the Journal article. The U.S. could supply low-enriched reactor fuel to the Saudis and take back the spent fuel, in return for a promise not to enrich or reprocess. Moniz suggested a 10-year term that could then be renewed.
— Kennedy Maize